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The Philosopher’s Stone
In this chapter I will focus on the development of the early
Schleiermacher’s ethical theory. At this early stage, we find Schleier-
macher working on issues closely related to a problem that would
continually preoccupy him throughout his life, namely, the question
of the ground of the unity of the personality. As I demonstrate in this
study, Schleiermacher’s answer to the question evolved over the years.
By the time he had produced the first edition of the Christian Faith
appearing in 1821–2, it had already achieved its definitive contours.
But Schleiermacher arrived at the position that he did through a
sustained reflection on foundational metaethical issues. He did so
by engaging the philosophies of figures such as Spinoza, Leibniz,
Kant, Jacobi, Schelling, and Fichte. Two of the greatest influences on
Schleiermacher’s thought, I will argue, are Kant and Leibniz.1 In this
chapter I discuss how Schleiermacher’s early ethics were shaped by his
attempt to deal with the problems raised by Kant’s understanding of
transcendental freedom. In particular, we here find Schleiermacher
concerned with the problems that positing transcendental freedom
poses to the unity of the personality.
In his ethics Kant distinguishes between the moral principle of
discrimination (principium diiudicationis) and the moral principle of
execution (principium executionis). The former has to do with ethical
judgment—how we decide that an action is right or wrong, and the
latter with what moves us to do the right thing. It is a fundamental
1 In his February 2, 1790 letter to Brinkman, Schleiermacher writes that his “belief
in this [Kant’s] philosophy increases day by day, and this all the more, the more I
compare it with that of Leibniz” (KGA V.1, no. 134, 191). While Kant is certainly a
leading influence, so is Leibniz. As I will show later in the book, Schleiermacher’s
mature position is one that imposes a Kantian turn on Leibnizian ideas.
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16 Transformation of the Self
feature of Kant’s critical ethics that he considered the two to be
intrinsically intertwined: the moral principle of discrimination, i.e.
the categorical imperative, can only be valid if we are transcendentally
free. As a rational, and thereby a universal and a priori practical
principle, its bindingness cannot depend on any empirically given
desires. This, however, implies that a purely rational principle can be
an incentive for the will. Kant himself was deeply perplexed about
how this could be possible, calling the difficulties occasioned by such
an idea “the philosopher’s stone.”
The early Schleiermacher, on the other hand, while sympathetic
to Kant’s project, became increasingly dissatisfied with some of the
deep philosophical problems posed by the notion of transcenden-
tal freedom. How do we connect a transcendentally free act with
the nature of the subject? Insofar as the act is transcendentally
free, it cannot be understood in terms of causes, and this means
that it cannot be connected with the previous state of the indi-
vidual before he or she engaged in the act. Insofar as this is the
case, the act is given ex nihilo and cannot be connected with an
agent’s character. Given the intractability of this problem, Schleier-
macher wanted to preserve Kant’s understanding of the moral prin-
ciple of discrimination as a rational principle while denying that
the moral principle of execution is not connected with feeling and
with the character of the agent. Hence the ground of an action must
be found in the totality of an agent’s representations, that is, how
a person understands a situation is a crucial factor in the deter-
mination of how that person will act. Since a person’s character
is intricately involved with how a person assesses a situation, this
move allows Schleiermacher to connect the ground of an action with
character.
In this chapter, I work through these ideas by taking a thor-
ough look at some of Schleiermacher’s early essays and reviews.
My main focus will be Schleiermacher’s early essay On Freedom,
written between 1790–2. I will, however, also be taking a look
at Schleiermacher’s notes on Kant’s second Critique (1789), the
third of his Dialogues on Freedom (1789) and his critical review
of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1799).
While other treatments have detailed Schleiermacher’s arguments
and disagreements with Kant as set out in these works, they have
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not paid sufficient attention to the development of Schleiermacher’s
views regarding these questions. Whereas many of Schleiermacher’s
contemporary commentators understand On Freedom as standing in
fundamental continuity with his earlier treatments of Kant’s moral
philosophy2 I will argue that Schleiermacher’sOn Freedom is not only
the most mature, but also the most Kantian of Schleiermacher’s early
ethical writings. Reflection on many of the issues regarding freedom
andmorality led him to reject empiricism as a foundation for morals,
thereby bringing him closer to Kant. It is no doubt true that signif-
icant differences between Kant’s theory and his own still remained.
However, it is important to locate precisely at what point it is that
Schleiermacher disagreed with Kant inOn Freedom.His disagreement
with Kant at this point is a different and more subtle one than that
expressed in his earlier writings; for one, by this time the philosophy
of moral sense no longer had the same influence that it once had
on Schleiermacher’s thought.3 Rather, here we find Schleiermacher
2 In his book Deterministische Ethik und kritische Theologie, Günter Meckenstock
notes that Schleiermacher’s intention is to make Kant’s practical philosophy more
consistent (50). However, after detailing the deep differences between Kant’s practical
philosophy and the variety of moral sense philosophy espoused by Schleiermacher
in the Freiheitsgespräch, he goes on to note that Schleiermacher’s task in On Free-
dom is to fill out the outlines of the theory sketched in the “Notes on Kant”
and in the Freiheitsgespräch (51). In her article “The Early Philosophical Roots of
Schleiermacher’s Notion of Gefühl, 1788–1794” Julia A. Lamm reads On Freedom
as continuing the “trajectory begun in On the Highest Good” (82), interpreting it as
developing an understanding ofGefühl in which it is presented as “the faculty that not
only harmonizes the moral sentiments but also enables us to transcend certain senti-
ments in order to attain higher ones” (89); I have not found evidence for this reading
in the text. Albert Blackwell’s book Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Deter-
minism, Freedom and Phantasy, presents Schleiermacher as denying the possibility of
the direct influence of reason on the will in On Freedom (44), thereby understanding
the essay as standing in direct continuity with his earlier works. Another fine essay
in which On Freedom is discussed at some length is John P. Crossley’s “The Ethical
Impulse in Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics,” although the specific issue with which I am
concerned is not addressed in it.
3 As pointed out by John Wallhauser in his article “Schleiermacher’s Critique of
Ethical Reason: Toward a Systematic Ethic,” by the time Schleiermacher writes his
Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theories (published 1803), he clearly rejects
the more recent English and French moral philosophy as belonging to traditions of
feeling (29). The problem with this tradition, as with other eudaimonistic theories,
is “its failure to draw a clear line between the ethical and the natural (reason and
nature); it tends to collapse the ethical into a description of natural impulses rather
than positing a distinct sphere and power of its own (reason/spirit)” (30).
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18 Transformation of the Self
performing a subtle about face concerning the issue of whether reason
can influence the will, one that will lead him notably closer to Kant’s
views.
The chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part, I will
discuss why Kant asserts that reason can, in fact, pose as an incentive
to the will as well as the nature of the deep philosophical problems
that this idea has posed. In the second part I will discuss Schleierma-
cher’s attempt to circumvent some of these difficulties. Here I discuss
both of his earlier, more naive treatments of the problem dating
from 1789, as well as his rather sophisticated attempt to provide us
with what seems, at first blush, to be a more palatable, compatibilist
account of freedom, one which nonetheless seems to cohere with the
main outlines of a Kantian ethic found in his moremature treatiseOn
Freedom. The third section will provide a philosophical assessment of
Kant’s and Schleiermacher’s respective positions, analyzing both their
strengths and weaknesses.
THE STUMBLING BLOCK [STEIN DES ANSTOßES]
OF ALL EMPIRICISTS
It is a well-known fact that in his fully critical ethics Kant came to the
conclusion that a moral law binding all rational agents implies tran-
scendental freedom. This is a “thick” concept of freedom that must
be understood in a strictly incompatibalist or indeterminist sense. It
implies “a power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore also
of absolutely beginning a series of consequences of that state.”4 An
“absolute beginning” is one that is not preceded by another temporal
state that determines it and is as such independent from all determin-
ing causes. Kant himself was aware of many of the difficulties that
such a conception posed and called it “the stumbling block [Stein des
Anstoßes] of all empiricists but the key to the most sublime practical
4 Immanuel Kant,Critique of Pure Reason. References to theCritique of Pure Reason
are to the standard A and B paginations of the first and second editions and will
henceforth be included in the body of the chapter preceded by KRV. In this case the
reference would appear as KRV A445/B473.
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principles for critical moralists”5 In his notes on Kant’s second Cri-
tique as well as in his essay On Freedom, Schleiermacher details
many of these difficulties and tries to offer an alternative account of
how a rationalistic ethic can co-exist with a compatibilist account
of freedom. Before we can understand both the difficulties and
the ingenuity of Schleiermacher’s attempts at a solution, however,
it is important to understand the depth of the problem as Kant
himself did.
While the semi-critical Kant believed that the principle of dis-
crimination through which the moral law is determined is purely
intellectual and a priori, at this stage he did not think that such
an intellectual principle could pose as a moral incentive [Triebfeder]
to the will. In his Lectures on Ethics, dating from 1775 to 1780, Kant
noted that
Moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment. My under-
standing may judge that an action is morally good, but it need not follow
that I shall do that action which I judge morally good: from understanding
to performance is still a far cry . . . The understanding, obviously, can judge,
but to give to this judgment of the understanding a compelling force, to
make it an incentive that can move the will to perform the action—this is
the philosopher’s stone.6
A little later Kant notes, “Man is not so delicately made that he can be
moved by objective grounds.”7
In his critical ethics, however, Kant came to the conclusion that
the possibility of being moved by objective grounds (the moral law)
carries with it the implication of transcendental freedom. The critical
Kant came to this conclusion because the very idea of a moral prin-
ciple that is necessarily binding implies that its bindingness cannot
depend on any empirically given desires. The validity of a hypo-
thetical imperative lies in a preceding desire for an object, that is,
only given a particular desire to achieve a certain goal is the will
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. All future references to Kant’s sec-
ond Critique will be cited in the body of the text itself. They will be indicated byKprV,
followed by the Berlin Academy Edition volume number and pagination; reference to
Beck’s English translation will follow a semicolon. In this case the references would
appear as KprV 5:7; 8.
6 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 45. 7 Ibid. 68.
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necessitated to perform certain actions in order to accomplish it.
The rule given through such an imperative is only hypothetically
necessary, and this implies that any kind of rule for the will based
on a preceding desire cannot necessitate the will categorically. This
means, however, that the bindingness of a categorical imperative can-
not depend on any empirically given desires. According to Kant, this
in turn implies transcendental freedom, for the moral law can only be
binding upon us if it can move us to action, but insofar as it is cate-
gorical it can bind us only insofar as a previously existing desire is not
the ground of the incentive. The incentive must, rather, be grounded
in reason, and insofar as reason is itself a product of our spontaneity,
such an incentive is intricately involved with the power of absolutely
beginning a series of actions, and hence with transcendental
freedom.
The two most profound difficulties raised by Kant’s scheme have
to do with a) how a purely intellectual principle can motivate the will
and with b) the problem of transcendental freedom. Kant recognized
both the intractable nature of the two problems, as well as their
intrinsic connection when he noted, “how a law in itself can be the
direct motive of the will (which is the essence of morality) is an insol-
uble problem for the human reason. It is identical with the problem
of how a free will is possible” (KprV 5: 72; 75). Schleiermacher’s notes
on Kant’s second Critique are principally directed to coming to terms
with precisely these two difficulties. We should keep in mind that
these notes are Schleiermacher’s earliest attempt to come to grips with
these issues, and are subsequently beset with incongruities overcome
in his later reflections.
In his notes on Kant’s second Critique Schleiermacher expresses
dissatisfaction with Kant’s account of respect for the moral law, the
locus of Kant’s discussion of how a purely intellectual principle can
motivate the will. In his second Critique Kant had explained that the
moral law checks self love and strikes down self conceit (KprV 5: 73;
76); furthermore, respect “weakens the hindering influence of the
inclinations through humiliating self-conceit; consequently, we must
see it as a subjective ground of activity, as an incentive for obedience
to the law” (KprV 5: 38; 40). Schleiermacher complains that Kant’s
account still fails to provide an explanation for the genesis of the
feeling connected to the influence of the moral law: “Only a negative
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feeling originates directly from the relation of practical reason to
self-conceit, and if one says everything that one possibly can about
an inhibition of the causality of a pathologically driven feeling . . . it is
still, however, not an incentive.”8 Furthermore, Schleiermacher adds
that
it seems to me that he [Kant] did not achieve this either [clarifying the
genesis of a feeling a priori], for even if I understand that practical reason
must occasion an effect on feeling, all that I can understand by this “a
priori” . . . is first only an indirect effect in that certain ideas, which would
otherwise encourage the feeling, are destroyed; second, only negative in that
what was otherwise present in feeling through those ideas is annulled; third,
no particular distinct feeling . . .How the positive can be understood a priori
is still left as empty as before, as is the claim that this feeling distinguishes
itself from all other.9
Schleiermacher is correct to note that Kant’s account provides for
only an indirect influence of the moral law on feeling: in checking
self love and striking down self conceit it blocks the effect of these
pathologically motivated feelings and thereby strengthens the moral
incentive. These are, however, already effects of the moral law on
previously existing feelings, and while an explanation of these effects
on these pre-existing feelings may help to illuminate certain psycho-
logical processes, it still affords us insight neither into the nature of
the incentive directly connected with the moral law nor into how
such an incentive is possible. In other words, while Kant may have
provided us with an account of the effect that the moral law has on
an individual when s/he recognizes its absolute worth, he still has
not explained how a person can recognize such absolute worth in
the moral law to begin with. The explanation of how practical reason
occasions an effect on feeling is left just as obscure as before, and no
8 “Notizen zu Kant: KpV” in Schleiermacher Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Jugend-
schriften 1787–1796, 132; henceforward KGA I.1. All English excerpts from
Schleiermacher’s notes on Kant’s second Critique, as well as Schleiermacher’s “Note
on the Knowledge of Freedom” and his “Review of Kant’s Anthropology from a
Practical Point of View” are my own translations. The translated texts can be found
in their entirety in my “A Critical-Interpretive Analysis of Some Early Writings by
Schleiermacher on Kant’s Views of Human Nature and Freedom (1789–1799) with
Translated Texts.”
9 KGA I.1, 133.
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real explanation is given as to how we can understand the genesis of a
feeling a priori.
It is important to grasp the deep structure of the difficulty con-
cerning how a purely intellectual principle can become a motivat-
ing ground of the will. In order for the moral law to motivate us
it must affect the faculty of desire in some way, and this involves
feeling.10 The problem becomes particularly acute since feeling has
to do with our sensuous nature, and thereby with our receptivity, that
is, our capacity for being affected from without. The understanding,
on the other hand, is spontaneous. Spontaneity and receptivity are,
according to Kant, two distinct faculties of human nature. How can
feeling be affected by the moral law (a purely intellectual principle)?
In order for it to be so affected there must be some capacity in our
very faculty of receptivity that already allows that faculty to recognize
the unconditioned worth of the moral law, but this already involves
a judgment of the understanding. This would imply that the faculty
of receptivity is itself somehow capable of true judgment, which is
impossible. The problem thereby seems to be intractable. It can be
understood from yet another angle. The judgment of the uncondi-
tioned worth of the moral law presupposed by such an incentive has
10 In his book Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom and
Phantasy, Albert Blackwell represents Kant’s understanding of the moral incentive
as follows: “Incentives involve feelings, and yet, if moral obligation is not to be
undermined, the means of influence of the moral law cannot involve feeling ‘of any
kind whatsoever’ ” (29). Later on he notes “unlike Kant and Reinhold, Schleiermacher
never speaks of the influence of reason on the will as being ‘direct.’ The influence of
reason upon our intentions is bymeans of incentives, and the incentives of reason, like
all other incentives, involve feelings”(44). This is a somewhat misleading presentation,
both of Kant and of Schleiermacher’s understanding of him, since Kant never asserts
that reason cannot influence feeling; in fact, the whole section entitled “On the Drives
of Pure Practical Reason” in the second Critique concerns precisely how reason does
influence feeling. For instance, Kant notes “Whatever checks all inclinations in self-
love necessarily has, by that fact, an influence on feeling. Thus we conceive how it is
possible to understand a priori that the moral law can exercise an effect on feeling
since it blocks the inclinations . . . ” KprV 5: 75; 78. When Kant speaks of the influence
of reason on the will as being direct, he does not mean that it does not have an
influence on our affective nature; in fact, it must, if reason is to be an incentive.
What Kant does mean is that no pre-existing feeling can be the ground or the basis of
the validity of the moral law; if it were, the law would be reduced to a hypothetical
imperative. As can be seen from my discussion of Schleiermacher’s On Freedom,
below, by the time that Schleiermacher writes this treatise he is fully in agreement
with Kant’s reasoning regarding this issue.
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two components. Insofar as we stress the absolute and unconditioned
worth of the moral law, we must rely on reason for the judgment of
its unconditioned character. However, insofar as we stress the worth
of the moral law, we are concerned with a question of value, and
hence with the subject and his or her attitudes or feelings, since the
assignment of worth cannot be defined in purely logical or rational
terms. Hence the question becomes: how can the rational principle
itself be the ground of the absolute worth that the moral subject must
assign to it? 11
In the “Notes” we find Schleiermacher attempting to come to
grips with this problem. While he agrees with Kant that the moral
law cannot be empirically grounded, he questions whether making
feeling indispensable to the determination of the faculty of desire
necessarily results in an empirically grounded practical principle. He
believes that he can show that the implication is not an inevitable
one, arguing that the ethical principle of discrimination (principium
diiudicationis) can be separated from the ground of moral motivation
(principium executionis). The key here, according to Schleiermacher,
is not to equate the determination of the faculty of desire with the
giving of rules for the will, two elements closely connected in Kant’s
practical philosophy. Schleiermacher does not consider Kant justified
in having linked the two: he complains that Kant has shown neither
that they are analytically nor synthetically combined.
It is here that Schleiermacher’s analysis of the inadequacy of Kant’s
theory of non-moral motivation comes in. This theory specifies that
the faculty of desire is empirically determined when pleasure is what
marks an object as worthy of desire. Yet if pleasure is that which
marks an object as worthy of desire, the pleasure gotten from the
realization of the object, and not the object itself, is the final goal
11 Much the same is noted by Dieter Henrich in his article, “Das Problem der
Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und in Spekulativen Idealismus.” There he notes
that “Die Vernunft für sich allein hat keine Kraft ‘eine Handlung zu exekutieren’.
Selbst die Billigung (complacentia), die wir dem Guten zollen, ist kein in der Logik
zu definierender Akt. Sie ist wie jene emotionaler Natur. So scheint eine Antinomie
zu bestehen, die zu lösen den Stein des Weisen ausgraben heißt: Entweder die Ethik
wahrt den rationalen Charakter der sittlichen Forderung; dann sind die Triebfeder des
sittlichen Willens nicht verständlich zu machen. Oder sie geht von der Sittlichkeit als
einer Kraft zu handeln aus; dann is der Vernunftcharakter des Guten nicht zu wahren.”
369.
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of non-morally motivated action. But Schleiermacher remarks that
there is something wrong in thinking that pleasure, rather than the
realization of a desired object, is the goal of non-moral motivation.
The correct understanding of the relation between satisfaction and
desire is that the realization of an object brings satisfaction because it
is desired.
Schleiermacher thereby argues that Kant could only have shown
that the determination of the faculty of desire was synthetically com-
bined with the giving of rules for the will on the presupposition
that “the feeling, which is necessary in order to set the faculty of
desire in motion is also the only possible end to which the desire
itself could be directed.”12 He reasons that if the feeling of pleasure
is not the end to which an empirically given desire is directed, then
feeling can motivate without at the same time determining the rules
of action for the will. At this point it is important to recall the Kantian
analysis of the lower faculty of desire and its relation to heteronomous
action. An object is desired because its realization will bring pleasure,
and reason figures out the means for the realization of the object.
However, because it is desire that marks out the object to be realized
in the first place, desire is the ground of the rule for the will; reason
is only instrumental in providing the rule through which the object
of desire can be achieved. Schleiermacher concludes that if pleasure
is not the final goal of non-moral action, the lower faculty of desire
cannot be the ground of any rules for the will. Kant’s linkage between
the principle of execution and that of discrimination has been thereby
effectively severed.
What Schleiermacher has accomplished here, however, remains
rather questionable. Given this account, Schleiermacher is still faced
with the task of providing an account of how an object of desire
relates to the emotional character of the agent, that is, of how it is
that the object of desire comes to be desired. More importantly, his
argument here seems to be at cross-purposes with his initial goal,
which was to ground the moral incentive in feeling or moral sense.
Such a theory holds that the worth that the moral law has for us
is based on the satisfaction that is associated with acting on it, on
the one hand, and the pangs of conscience linked with failing to live
12 “Notizen zu Kant: KpV” KGA I.1, 131.
02-Marina-c01 OUP191-Marina (Typeset by SPi, Delhi) page 25 of 42 March 6, 2008 11:38
The Philosopher’s Stone 25
up to it, on the other. But if, as Schleiermacher seems to want to
be arguing here, an object is not desired in virtue of the pleasure it
will bring, presumably then acting morally cannot be attractive to us
because of the satisfaction that is associated with acting on the moral
law, either.
SCHLEIERMACHER’S COMPATIBILIST PROPOSAL
In the third of his Dialogues on Freedom (1789) Schleiermacher
attempts to forge a middle position between Kant’s understanding
of respect for the moral law and a theory of moral sensibility. The
dialogue involves three friends, the Kantian Kritias, Sophron, whose
position represents Schleiermacher’s, and Kleon. Towards the latter
part of the dialogue Sophron reminds Kleon that their intention in
discussing these matters was to determine the extent to which reason
influences our actions, and concludes that “we have found nothing
but that such an influence can nowhere take place, and that moreover
all our actions flow from the feeling of pleasure and the attempt to
get it.”13 He proceeds to outline a theory of moral sensibility wherein
experience is a key component in allowing us to determine which
actions will bring us pleasure and which will bring us pain. It is
experience that “acquaints us with the different powers of our soul;
it is that which informs us of the nature of our pleasure and that it
is only harmony and perfection that can delight us” (KGA I.1, 155).
The imagination works with this data, thereby giving us a foretaste of
virtue.
Sophron later qualifies his original statement that the influence
of reason on our actions can nowhere take place: insofar as we find
pleasure in virtue, reason can influence the will. Hence he notes that
“the capacity to act according to rational grounds means nothing
other than the capacity to be determined by a feeling of pleasure
that works through the moral ideas of reason” (KGA I.1, 160). He
continues by noting that this “pleasure is completely sensory; it has a
13 “Freiheitsgespräch,” KGA I.1, 153; future references to the text will be included
in the body of the chapter. All excerpts are my own translations.
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sensory magnitude and a sensory effectiveness, although it is caused
by an object in which nothing sensory is to be found, namely the
eternal and unchangeable laws of reason” (KGA I.1, 160). Despite
the fact that Schleiermacher here concedes that reason can have an
influence on the will, the crux of the matter is that it can have such
an influence in virtue of a pre-existing disposition to find pleasure
in the moral law. At this point Schleiermacher has not grasped the
intrinsic interconnections between the principle of discrimination
and that of execution discovered by the critical Kant: if the latter is
empirically grounded, that is, is dependent on a given condition or
susceptibility of the subject, then so is the former. It is impossible
to be moved by a practical principle in virtue of pre-existing sus-
ceptibilities to find pleasure in such a principle, and to at one and
the same time identify the underlying maxim on which one is acting
with eternal and unchanging laws of reason. This is because if one
is moved to act in accordance with a practical principle because it
brings one pleasure, the maxim underlying one’s action to act on
the practical principle is that of maximizing one’s own happiness or
pleasure, a merely subjective principle which could never qualify as a
universal law.
Another significant feature of Schleiermacher’s account in the third
of the dialogues is his attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the
psychological conditions of the possibility of moral motivation. Thus
he makes the observation that while reason does play a role in moral
motivation, it is not the only factor involved. He notes that
we therefore cannot maintain that this feeling is determined by pure reason
alone (which indeed is always unaltered and the same) but must affirm
rather that it is determined by the receptivity of the faculty of sensation [des
Empfindungsvermögens] to being affected by the representation of the moral
law. This receptivity is dependent upon other conditions each time.14
(KGA I.1, 163)
Insofar as feeling is involved, it depends on the receptivity of the
faculty of sensation. This receptivity is not, however, a given con-
stant, and is not always affected in the same way by the moral law.
14 Quoted from Albert Blackwell’s introduction to Schleiermacher’s On Freedom,
xv.
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How it is affected by the moral law depends upon at least two fac-
tors: (1) the strength with which the moral law is represented and
(2) other factors, such as previously existing emotions, wants, wishes
and desires, which may interfere with or enhance the impact that
the moral law has on the faculty of sensation. For example, if an
individual is overly preoccupied with professional advancement, and
is considering acting on an immoral maxim, this preoccupation may
be so strong that it overpowers the effect that the moral law has on
feeling. The effect of his/her prior preoccupation on feeling may be so
strong that it overtakes that faculty altogether, leaving little possibility
for it to be affected by the moral law. The moral law may thereby fail
to be an incentive for the will.
The story Schleiermacher offers here has some similarities to the
one he will offer in his longer treatise On Freedom. Both are intended
to show how an account of moral motivation can be fully integrated
with an account of a person’s character. There are, however, some
significant differences between the story offered in the third dialogue
and the one offered in On Freedom; the former seems almost primi-
tive compared to the more robust theory offered in the latter treatise.
The Freiheitsgespräch portrays an individual’s desires as having an
effect on his/her total emotive constitution; this prior determination
of feeling limits the effect that a given representation can have on feel-
ing and thereby serves to determine the person’s future desires. For
example, my desire formoremoneymay be connected with a particu-
lar dissatisfaction concerning my present state as well as with a feeling
of heady excitement given the prospect of a viable get-rich-quick
scheme. These pre-existing feelings may in turn determine howmuch
I will dwell upon other representations, for instance the idea of enjoy-
ingmy present situation and time withmy husband. I may be so over-
whelmed with dissatisfaction that I am not a millionaire, and so dizzy
with the emotion that the idea of a future possibility of wealth evokes
in me that I cannot dwell upon the idea of enjoying what is presently
within my grasp. Given my prior emotional state, the representation
of what is presently enjoyable cannot make a deep enough impression
on me, for it simply cannot hold my interest, nor can it change my
present feelings. Note that this amounts to a strict determination of
action by desire, or a strict determination of future desires by past
desires.
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In contrast, Schleiermacher’s account of moral motivation in On
Freedom is much more sophisticated. In fact, a reader of the first
part of the treatise would be struck by its almost thoroughly Kantian
character. How far Schleiermacher’s views have swung in a Kantian
direction in the first section of On Freedom, particularly as compared
with the position espoused in the notes on Kant’s second Critique as
well as in the Freiheitsgespräch, can be gauged by his avowal that the
principle of discrimination cannot be effectively separated from the
principle of execution. He notes that “reason becomes practical only
through the idea of obligation to its laws,”15 that is, “reason’s dictums
must be able to become objects of an impulse” (KGA I.1: 233; 18). He
reasons further that
this must be true not simply to the extent that what reason commands
happens to be in accord with some inclination, that is insofar as reason’s dic-
tums relate mediately to a sensible object, but rather precisely insofar as the
dictums relate immediately to the law. That is, even if in some particular case
the law’s will should become actual through an accidental relation, the law
has no influence on the faculty of desire, and so this relation cannot establish
the idea that it is possible in every case to realize the command of reason.
This involves a feeling, and thereby an impulse, which relates immediately
and exclusively to practical reason and at the same time represents practical
reason in the faculty of desire. (KGA I.1: 233; 18)
In other words, the moral law must itself be a motive for the will.16
His argument for the claim accords with Kant’s: if the moral law were
not able to pose as an incentive to the will, the coincidence of one’s
maxims with themoral lawwould bemerely accidental. Furthermore,
under such a scenario, whatever one’s practical principle, it cannot
15 On Freedom, trans. by Albert L. Blackwell. The German can be found in KGA
I.1, 219–356. Future references to the text will be included in the body of the chapter.
I first provide the KGA pagination; reference to Blackwell’s English translation will
follow a semicolon. In this case the reference would appear as KGA I.1 232; 17.
16 Note that Schleiermacher’s claim regarding the need for the immediacy of the
relation of practical principles or “dictums” to the moral law is in principle equivalent
to Kant’s claim that “what is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral
law should determine the will directly” KprV 5: 71; 75. This is in fact the opposite
of the position he espoused in On the Highest Good, where he noted that “the law of
reason can never determine our will immediately” (“Über das höchste Gut,” in KGA
I.1, 123). Blackwell is mistaken when he claims that one of Schleiermacher’s main
points in On Freedom is to criticize Kant’s idea that an a priori practical principle can
directly influence the will. Blackwell, 29ff.
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be a categorical imperative. What would really be driving an action
would be some presupposed end, and this means that moral require-
ments would be treated as hypothetical imperatives instead of as
intrinsically obligatory.17 In such a situation a categorical imperative
as such would have no influence on the will, and while one’s maxims
might accord with legality they would not be moral. In order for
the categorical imperative to be the principle that is in fact guiding
one’s will it must in fact be chosen as such. In order for it to be
chosen, however, it must be able to be deemed a principle worth
acting on, and as such it must be able to pose as an incentive to
the will.
Whatmakes this workmore sophisticated than the third of hisDia-
logues on Freedom, however, is Schleiermacher’s distinction between
choice and instinct, and what he does with it. In the first part of the
treatise Schleiermacher tells us that “insofar as impulse to some par-
ticular activity can be determined by a single object alone, the faculty
of desire is called instinct, but insofar as it arrives at some particular
activity solely by comparing several objects it is called choice” (KGA
I.1: 224; 8). Key here is the idea that in instinct a being’s desire is
“hard-wired” to a particular object or group of objects. There is no
complex mechanism internal to the subject that allows for variation
in desire. Thus Schleiermacher lists the following two characteristics
of instinct: (1) “an action persists only until the determining object
itself ceases, and (2) . . .where instinct is present, desire follows imme-
diately upon the appearance of the object, and the tendency toward
action follows immediately upon desire” (KGA I.1: 224; 9). In such
a case the organism is so constituted that the very appearance of the
object elicits desire. Later on he notes that if external objects “were
to include not only the basis for our being affected . . . but also the
basis for the preponderance necessary to every act of choice, then with
every external object there would have to be given not only a general
influence on the faculty of desire but also a determinate quality and
quantity of this influence, not alterable by any inner characteris-
tic of the subject” (KGA I.1: 235; 20). In contrast, choice involves
a complexity of processes internal to the subject. The individual
17 Henry Allison provides an insightful analysis of Kant’s arguments regarding the
issue in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 99–106.
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that has choice is not hard-wired to desire any given thing; further,
such a being can find value in several different things and compare
their relative strengths. As such, the attraction that any given object
effects upon the faculty of desire does not immediately occasion
desire per se, but rather, “the object appears and the faculty of desire
craves . . . the complete determination of impulse still remains sus-
pended by consciousness of the necessity to take into account several
determining grounds, and only when this has occurred does it desire”
(KGA I.1: 226; 10). Hence the determinative feature of choice is the
ability of the individual to postpone action and to weigh alternative
options. This ability is possible because while an object may no doubt
affect the will, it is yet not, of itself, sufficient to determine the will
to action.18
The idea of choice, involving as it does several possible objects
of desire, naturally elicits the question of what is going to ground
the final determination of the faculty of desire one way or another.
Schleiermacher carefully distinguishes the idea of choice from the idea
that given several objects of choice the will is determined to act through
the outcome of the balance of attractive and repulsive forces elicited
by these objects. He notes that
if several simultaneously affecting objects partially annul their influence
reciprocally, we could regard what remains as itself an object (since with
respect to its influence it would be determined in only one way). This
object’s impression would be unalterable, and the faculty of desire would
be absolutely determined to it. (KGA I.1: 235–6; 20)
It is important to note that the “balance of forces” view that
Schleiermacher rejects is more sophisticated than the naive notion
that an agent simply acts on its strongest desire, since if action
on one’s strongest desire precludes a whole host of other options,
the cumulative attraction of these other options may serve to out-
weigh the strength of one’s strongest desire. Schleiermacher rejects
this more sophisticated view because it presents the subject as sim-
ply being affected from without. In it external influences, whether
18 So Schleiermacher: “Whenever our faculty of desire is affected from without, we
are conscious that this is not yet sufficient to determine it, and every determination
of impulse appears to us within the realm between craving and desiring” (KGA I.1:
227; 11).
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they be the influence of a single object, or the influence of a bal-
ance of attractive and repulsive forces elicited by several objects, are
represented as the ultimate determining ground of an individual’s
choice.
Given his observations on choice and instinct, Schleiermacher con-
cludes that while the moral law can motivate, it cannot of itself be
sufficient to determine the will. He arrives at this conclusion by first
noting that a “natural undeterminedness of the will is necessary if
that relation of the law to the faculty of desire entailed by the idea
of obligation is to be possible” (KGA I.1: 233; 17), in other words
the idea of obligation is inapplicable to a will that necessarily acts
in accordance to the moral law.19 Moreover, if acting in accordance
with the moral law is truly to involve choice, the law cannot be
sufficient to determine the will to action. The impulse or incentive
provided by the moral law “must have exactly the same relation to
the faculty of desire as every other”20 (KGA I.1: 233; 18), and this
means that just as other objects can be viewed as desirable without
their desirability being a sufficient condition of their initiating action,
so it is the same with the moral law. We must, in fact, hold this to
be the case in order to make sense of how it is possible that persons
can stand under an intrinsic moral obligation and yet fail to meet its
demands.
Schleiermacher concludes that “no single object of our faculty of
desire, whether internal or external . . . has a determinative influence,
19 On this point he stands in fundamental agreement with Kant; see Groundwork
for the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant notes that “if reason for itself alone does
not sufficiently determine the will, if the will is still subject to subjective conditions
(to certain incentives) which do not always agree with the objective conditions, in
a word, if the will is not in itself fully in accord with reason (as it actually is with
human beings), then the actions which are objectively recognized as necessary are
subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will, in accord with objective
laws, is necessitation . . . The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is
necessitating for a will, is called a ‘command’ (of reason), and the formula of the
command is called an imperative”(KGS 4: 413; Wood, 29–30).
20 My interpretation of what is going on is fundamentally at odds with that of Julia
Lamm, who in her book The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropriation of
Spinoza, argues that this idea “marks Schleiermacher’s most rebellious stance against
Kant” 45. To the contrary, as my discussion below of Kant’s incorporation thesis will
demonstrate, Schleiermacher is at this point in his argument still in fundamental
agreement with Kant. It is only much later in his argument that the two positions
will diverge.
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invariable in all cases, either upon the faculty of desire in general
or upon its particulars, so that the preponderance of impression
requisite for any complete action of the faculty of desire cannot be
grounded in such objects” (KGA I.1: 236; 21). If this is true, we
are still confronted with Schleiermacher’s question “Wherein must
the origination of the preponderance of one portion of the deter-
mining ground of choice over other portions be grounded in each
case?” (KGA I.1: 234; 19). In other words, Schleiermacher asks, if
the attraction or repulsion that an object or its realization holds for
us is not of itself sufficient to determine the will, then what, ulti-
mately, is the ground of the will’s acting on one desire rather than
another? Schleiermacher answers that this ground must be found in
our subjectivity; more precisely, the effect that an object of desire can
have upon the will is determined by the way in which that object is
represented. Hence Schleiermacher notes that “Even if in some par-
ticular case the preponderance of one impulse over others is based
in such accidental determinations of the faculty of desire as have
been produced through its preceding activities, these in turn have
their first ground in the state of the faculty of representation . . . ”
(KGA I.1: 237; 22). Note that this position is the exact opposite of
the one espoused by Schleiermacher in his earlier third Dialogue on
Freedom; there the impact made by a representation was limited and
determined by preceding activities of the faculty of desire. Here the
reverse is true; just how attractive a course of action is depends on
how it is represented:
the preponderance in which every comparison of choice must end in order
to pass over into a complete action of the faculty of desire must in every
case be grounded in the totality of present representations and in the state
and interrelations of all the soul’s faculties that have been produced in the
progression of representations in our soul. (KGA I.1: 237–8; 22)
Which ideas will be associated with an external object, and which
desires, in turn, will be connected with these ideas depends on our
faculty of representation. For instance, our desire for an object may
vary with what we know of it. Put before a hungry individual a
sumptuous feast and she will of course desire it, but let her find
out that it is poisoned and her desire will surely wane. Further, the
desirability of an object is tied with how prominently it stands before
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consciousness. In some cases an individual may enable himself to
forego a temptation by putting the offending object out of mind and
concerning himself with other things. On the other hand, it is no
doubt true that desire is often heightened by dwelling upon a coveted
thing.
These and other related examples lead Schleiermacher to conclude
that no object is itself the ground of its desirability or attractiveness to
the will; rather it is desirable only insofar as it is represented as such,
and this means that desire is always intrinsically connected with the
representing activity of the subject. Because it is, there is “no degree of
impulse, however great [that] can be conceived to which an impulse
of higher degree cannot be juxtaposed” (KGA I.1: 239; 25). This is
what Schleiermacher calls “the boundlessness of impulse” (KGA I.1:
239; 25). By this he means that since the attraction an option holds
for us is always a function of how it is represented, no matter how
great the inducement to do one thing, it is still possible to be moved
to do the opposite. This is because the degree of attraction of the
opposite course of action also rests upon how it is represented. Hence
it is always in principle possible to follow the dictates of morality,
no matter how great the temptation to do otherwise: even if some
“sensible feeling is unduly elevated by my representations” yet “a
series of representations is possible through which the feeling rep-
resenting practical reason might be affected more strongly” (KGA I.1:
240; 25).
The similarities of Schleiermacher’s argument to that of Kant’s
are deep and surprising. An important feature of Kant’s practical
philosophy is his claim that “freedom of the power of choice has the
characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined
to action through any incentive except sofar as the human being has
incorporated it into his maxim,”21 that is, human freedom involves
an activity of the subject through which an inclination or desire is
deemed worth acting upon, or taken as a fitting ground of action.
Henry Allison has dubbed this Kant’s Incorporation Thesis and has
rightly pointed to its pivotal place at the core of Kant’s practical
philosophy. A central implication of this claim is that an incentive
21 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, (KGS 6: 24;
Giovanni and Wood, 73).
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or desire of itself is not a reason for action, and this means further
that the adoption of a practical principle or a maxim is never a causal
consequence of a person’s being in a state of desire.22 Schleiermacher’s
understanding of choice, involving as it does the assertion that while
objects of desire may affect the will, they are not sufficient grounds
for the determination of action, carries with it some of the same
implications.
There are, however, some significant differences between
Schleiermacher’s position and Kant’s. While Schleiermacher grounds
the ultimate worth that a subject assigns to a particular course
of action in the activity of the subject, and not in the causal
consequences of one’s being in a state of desire, he still wants to be
able to link the subject’s activity with its prior states. Noteworthy is
the fact that Schleiermacher grounds the ultimate worth that a subject
will assign to an object of desire in the faculty of representation, the
present state of which can be connected with a subject’s preceding
states in a lawlike manner. The weight of the whole of Kant’s
incorporation thesis, on the other hand, rests on the spontaneity of
the subject. Because a spontaneous action cannot be subjected to the
principles of causal determination, the action cannot be grounded in
the agent’s prior states.23
It is at this point, then, that Kant and Schleiermacher part
company. In positioning the sufficient ground of an action in
a subject’s representations, Schleiermacher has, through one and
the same argument, come as close as he possibly could to Kant’s
practical philosophy while at the same time having laid the
groundwork for his own psychological determinism. He thereby
seems to have provided a “compatibilist” version of a Kantian
practical philosophy and overcome the stumbling block of all
empiricists.
22 On this aspect of Kant’s practical philosophy, see Allison’s Kant’s Theory
of Freedom, especially 39–40, although the whole book is an extended argu-
ment concerning the importance of the incorporation thesis for Kant’s theory of
freedom.
23 It is, however, significant that according to Kant in the Religion, the ground of
an agent’s actions can be traced to the fundamental disposition. We can thus connect
the agent’s action with his/her character, but which fundamental disposition the agent
has chosen is still a matter of transcendental freedom.
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KANT OR SCHLEIERMACHER?
Schleiermacher’s compatibilist account of freedom and moral moti-
vation has much to recommend it. For one, it allows us to understand
our psychological processes in such a way that we can learn to steer
the course of our desires. He notes that “if we must seek the basis
for particular activities of the faculty of desire elsewhere than in the
state and other activities of the soul, then the inquiries concerning
our soul so natural to each of us are cut off at the root—inquiries
concerning laws of the soul’s various faculties . . . premises that would
have been requisite to come to some certain result, and the result that
certain premises would have produced” (KGA I.1: 240; 24–5). Later
on he notes that “without this idea we could in no way justify our
efforts to affect wills . . . ” (KGA I.1: 242; 28). The validity of the idea
that our present state is connected in a law-like manner with what
precedes it, and that further, it is the ground of our future states, is
connected with a certain practical interest: it allows for the care of
the soul, that is, the nurturing of dispositions that in the future will
bear moral fruit. On the other hand, the doctrine of the freedom of
the will, through which one comes to think of oneself as instantly
capable of realizing a moral goal without this involving a long and
arduous training of one’s character and dispositions is, according to
Schleiermacher, self deceptive. The feeling of freedom hides from us
the fact that “everything that yet lies between the present moment
and the anticipated one, as a means or preceding links in the chain,
really belongs to the attainment of that state” (KGA I.1: 294; 79). The
idea that there is no ground determining our ability to reach a moral
goal other than our very intention of realizing it (transcendental
freedom) only lulls us into unconcern through the false certainty
that such an intention is all that is required to achieve the proposed
end. Such a certainty “always does its utmost to make us miss our
goal” (KGA I.1: 294; 79). On the other hand the doctrine of necessity,
through which we can connect previous states of the soul with future
ones, allows us to understand how we may affect ourselves and others
in such a way as to bring us closer to moral perfection; it allows for
us to undertake a “therapy of desire.” Key to such self-affection is the
strengthening of the ethical impulse: whether it will be strong enough
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to overcome the opposing inclinations all depends upon the preced-
ing period in which it was forged. Schleiermacher asks: “ . . .will the
ethical impulse . . . be strong enough to prevail over opposing inclina-
tions?” and answers that necessity presents this as “depending upon
the content of the intervening period—upon the strengthening or
weakening of ethical feeling contained therein, upon the increasing
or diminishing power therein of ethical impulse through action, both
generally and in the particular respect under consideration” (KGA
I.1: 295; 80). Necessity teaches that because prior moral states affect
future ones, “You would have become so less (morally good) than
perhaps you will, had you not so vitally desired it in advance” (KGA
I.1: 295; 80).
Note all of this stands in agreement with a compatibilist under-
standing of freedom, according to which a person could have done
otherwise, and is hence free, provided that he or she had had dif-
ferent sorts of desires. This understanding allows Schleiermacher
to distinguish his own brand of determinism from fatalism. The
idea behind the fatalism of Greek tragedy is that a given result will
necessarily occur regardless of causal antecedents; Schleiermacher’s
determinism, on the other hand, propounds that given certain causal
antecedents, a given result will necessarily follow. While the former
principle is of no use to an investigation of the mechanism of desire
and its consequences, the latter is indispensable to any kind of psy-
chological insight, and hence to a therapy of desire.
Connected with Schleiermacher’s practical criticisms of the idea of
transcendental freedom is the fact that the conditions under which
an act may be attributed to an agent give rise to a certain “antinomy
of agency.” This antinomy is closely related to Kant’s third antinomy,
developed in the first Critique.24 Recall that the third antinomy con-
cerns the possibility of appealing to another mode of causality beside
that developed in the second analogy (causality in accordance with
the laws of nature). The kind of causality in question is transcen-
dental freedom, understood as “the power [Vermögen] of begin-
ning a state spontaneously [von Selbst]” (KRV 533/561). Since
Schleiermacher’s arguments take the side of the antithesis of this
24 The connection of the antinomy of agency with the cosmological conflict is
noted by Allison in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 28.
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antinomy, let me begin with a short exposition of it as it is presented
by Kant in the first Critique and later discuss its relevance to an
understanding of the antinomy of agency.
The antithesis of the third antinomy is relatively straightforward.
According to it, if we assume transcendental freedom (defined as “a
power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore absolutely begin-
ning a series of the consequences of that state” [KRV 445/473]),
then the unity of experience would be rendered impossible. This is
because every action “presupposes a state of the not-yet acting cause”
(KRV 445/473), that is, we must assume the existence of an agent
before it initiates an action, and furthermore, this agent must exist
in some given state. However, insofar as an action is transcenden-
tally free, it would be an absolute beginning and as such in no wise
grounded in the prior state of the agent. This means that the two
states, that of an agent before the initiation of an action and that of
the agent initiating the action could not be connected in a lawlike
manner.
As Allison notes, while the recognizably Leibnizian argument of
the antithesis concludes that if transcendental freedom were to be
assumed the unity of experience would be annulled, it also supports
the familiar compatibilist account of freedom also connected with
Leibniz. Leibniz had argued that an action must have a sufficient
reason grounded in the prior states of an agent; to deny this is to deny
the conditions under which the act could intelligibly be attributed
to that agent. The same point had already been made by Hume and
other compatibilists, and Schleiermacher argues along the same lines
inOn Freedom. A condition of act attribution is that we should be able
to relate an action to an agent and his or her character, that is, wemust
be able to understand how it flows from that character. If transcen-
dental freedom is assumed, however, no such connection between the
action and the character of the agent is possible. Schleiermacher asks,
“How can I be accountable for an action when we cannot determine
the extent to which it belongs tomy soul?” (KGA I.1: 316; 100–1). Our
ability to attribute the motive for an action to an agent depends on
that action’s being explicable in terms of an agent’s character. Failing
such a condition, the actions “have no ground at all, not even imme-
diately, and are based on chance” (KGA I.1: 316; 101), which means
they have nothing to do with the condition of the agent, that is, his
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or her psychological states and disposition. Schleiermacher concludes
that this idea of “complete chance . . . certainly annuls morality more
than anything else” (KGA I.1: 317; 101).
The thesis of the third antinomy is also significant in that it
relates in important ways to the conditions of the possibility of act
attribution. The thesis of the antinomy stipulates that it is nec-
essary to appeal to transcendental freedom, since without it mere
causality in accordance with the laws of nature would be subject
to two contradictory demands. These are, first, the principle that
every event must have a cause and second, the principle of suf-
ficient reason. The latter requirement is understood in the man-
ner developed by Leibniz in his polemic with Clarke: every occur-
rence must have a sufficient reason both in the sense that it have
antecedent causal conditions and in the sense that it have a complete
explanation. As Allison puts it, it is understood as both a “logical
principle requiring adequate grounds for any conclusion and as a
real or causal principle requiring sufficient preconditions for every
occurrence.”25 According to Kant, the law of nature itself demands
that “nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a
priori” (KRV 446/474). If, however, this very same law of nature
requires us to understand every event as itself having a cause, then the
requirement that a cause be sufficiently determined a priori cannot
be met. Since each event will have its ground in a cause preceding
it that is also an event and that is, as such, subject to the same
requirement that it also be grounded in a preceding event, com-
pleteness in the series of grounds determining an event can never be
given.
Now the problem encountered in the thesis of the third antinomy
becomes relevant to the question of act attribution in that if the
causality of nature is universally applied to actions, we would be
unable to find a sufficiently determined ground of an action that
is attributable to an agent per se. Instead, the grounds for each
action can eventually be traced to events pre-existing the agent
and so having nothing to do with him or her. Schleiermacher
is at the very least aware of these difficulties when he puts the
25 Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 17.
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following argument in the mouth of the opponents of his doctrine of
necessity:
This resonance of the soul is in turn a product of preceding and occasioning
impressions, and so, resist as we may, all is at last dissolved in external
impressions. So, of all that belongs to the action, what can we then assign to
the agent? Do we see the agent in some way? We can think of the agent only
as suffering! Or where is the power that is active? It dissolves into infinitely
many infinitesimally small external forces that leave us with nothing to think
of as firmly active in the subject. (KGA I.1: 257; 42–3)
The difficulty is a profound one: if we assume that all events are
subject to causal law, it becomes hard to distinguish actions from
events. Committing suicide by jumping off a ten-story windowwould
be little different from being pushed by someone from behind in
the significant sense that in both cases a pre-existing chain of events
led to the disaster with inexorable necessity; in both cases the indi-
vidual simply suffers what occurs to her. As Schleiermacher acutely
notes, in such a scheme the individual functions as a mere place-
holder for a given causal chain: s/he flashes “all the colors, but merely
according to the laws of refraction. Of all that you see in the person’s
actions, nothing belongs to the person” (KGA I.1: 257; 43). Since
the person does not initiate any action but is merely the locus in
which a certain causal chain occurs, we cannot attribute the actions
to her.
To summarize: the antinomy of agency suggests that act attribution
is subject to two conflicting requirements. The first is that an act be
explicable in terms of an agent’s character; the second is that an agent
should be the initiator of an act if it is to be attributed to him or her.
While Schleiermacher obviously tries to meet the first requirement,
it is unlikely that he succeeds in meeting the second. A simplistic
understanding of the differences between Kant and Schleiermacher
might suggest that while Schleiermacher decided to go with the first
requirement and to accept his losses regarding the second, Kant did
just the opposite. Kant’s position is, however, much more compli-
cated than this. He wants to hold that both the thesis and antithesis
of the third antinomy are compatible, since transcendental ideal-
ism creates a logical space for the idea of transcendental freedom.
It is important to realize that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a
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way of—as Allen Wood puts it—demonstrating the “compatibility
of compatibilism and incompatibilism.”26 Kant finds his way around
this seemingly intractable antinomy through his affirmation that both
points of view, i.e. the transcendental standpoint (corresponding to
freedom) and the empirical standpoint (corresponding to determin-
ism) are legitimate. Both freedom and determinism, however, can be
attributed to the same subject only when in each case the attribution
is made from a different standpoint.27 Insofar as the subject is con-
sidered as appearance, determinism applies; insofar as the subject is
considered in itself, freedom applies.
In his review of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
View, Schleiermacher raised serious questions about the viability of
such an option, especially as regards the possibility of a pragmatic
anthropology. How is one to affect oneself, to engage in any kind
of therapy of desire or care of the soul if transcendental freedom
is presupposed? If we speak of that which affects the mind, in the
way that Kant does in his Anthropology, do we not then begin to
treat the self as an appearance?28 What then of freedom? From a
practical perspective, Kant’s two points of view are very difficult to
keep separate. We often assume freedom when we think of our-
selves as resolving to make a radical change in our lives, but it is
often the case that in order for such a change to become a real-
ity we must nurse our subsequent desires in certain directions, we
must be equipped with certain psychological insights about our-
selves that will facilitate change in these desires, and we must suffer
26 Allen W. Wood, “Kant’s Compatibilism,” see especially 99–101.
27 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant notes: “The union of causality as free-
dom with causality as the mechanism of nature, the first being given through the
moral law and the latter through natural law, and both as related to the same subject,
man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in
relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the latter.
Otherwise the self-contradiction of reason is unavoidable” (KprV 5: 6; 6).
28 In his review of Kant’s Anthropology, Schleiermacher notes: “This gives rise to
the question: where do the ‘observations about what hinders or promotes a mental
faculty’ come from, and how are these observations to be used for the mind’s expan-
sion, if there are not physical ways to consider and treat this expansion in terms of the
idea that all free choice is at the same time nature?” [KGA I.2, 365–9]. Here he has
in mind Kant’s assertion in the Anthropology that so long as observations respecting
that which hinders or stimulates a faculty such as memory are used practically, they
belong in a pragmatic anthropology, one that presupposes freedom.
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through all the stages that are involved in such a change. All of
this involves some form of determinism. The question then remains
whether Kant was justified in requiring transcendental freedom from
a moral point of view. Cannot the concept be dispatched with alto-
gether in the way that Schleiermacher does? Does Schleiermacher
succeed in showing that the reality of the moral law as a motivat-
ing principle is consistent with a strictly compatibilist account of
freedom?
Despite the ingenuity of Schleiermacher’s discussion, I believe the
answer to the question whether the concept of transcendental free-
dom can be dispatched with is no on two counts. First, Schleierma-
cher ultimately fails to show how, assuming determinism, an action
can be understood as having been initiated by an agent, rather than
the agent being a mere locus wherein a predetermined event takes
place. There are hints in parts of On Freedom regarding how this
implication might be avoided, but they are undeveloped. Were they
developed, however, I believe they would ultimately imply transcen-
dental freedom at some level.29
Second, and more importantly, Schleiermacher’s account of moral
motivation ultimately fails to satisfy important conditions that are
necessary if the moral law is to be conceived as a rational practical
principle obligating all rational agents. The problem in Schleierma-
cher’s analysis is the following. If we can provide a deterministic
account concerning why an individual chooses to do x, while we
may have provided an exhaustive causal account regarding why x
was chosen, we still would not have shown that the agent had suf-
ficient reasons for doing x, that is, we would not have shown why
the agent ought to have done x. An agent who does x because s/he
was causally necessitated to do so cannot rationally justify her actions
on these grounds. We need carefully to distinguish rational necessity
29 For instance, in the middle of On Freedom, Schleiermacher notes: “We do not
want to feel a freeing from all necessity, because this exhibits itself in no case what-
soever, and our pretense would also be a vain attempt, but only a freeing from the
compulsion of the object, and this will occur whenever we determine our faculty of
desire through an idea that relates to pure self-consciousness” (72). As Crossley notes
in his article “The Ethical Impulse in Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics,” “This view of
accountability must mean, however, that a person has the power to alter his or her
character, even if particular actions are determined by the state of a person’s character
at any particular time” (14).
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grounded in objective laws of reason from causal necessity stemming
from antecedent conditions, a distinction that Schleiermacher fails
to make. While the incentive of the moral law is not sufficient to
determine the will to action from a causal standpoint, the objective
validity of the moral law itself provides sufficient reasons for action
in accordance with it, and in this sense the moral law is rationally
necessary. While Schleiermacher ultimately recognizes that if rea-
son is to be the source of moral laws it must be possible that pure
practical principles can have an influence on feeling, he yet wants to
give an account of how the extent of this influence is determined by
antecedent conditions in the subject, thereby once more reducing his
account to deterministic principles. However, Schleiermacher’s move,
as ingenious as it is, only pushes the problem he recognized in On
Freedom one step further back. There, it will be recalled, he noted
that there must be an “impulse” that relates exclusively to practical
reason, otherwise actions could only accidentally be in accordance
with the moral law. However, in order for an agent to have sufficient
reasons for action it is not enough to say that the moral law provides
an incentive for action in the same way that other empirically con-
ditioned desires have an influence on the will. The agent must also
in principle be able to provide an account of why all these impulses
are not on a par with one another, for instance, we must be able to
give an account of why the impulse to be moral is superior to, or has
more value than, the desire to kill when one feels like it. Unless the
agent acts in accordance with the moral law because she recognizes
that her impulse to be moral has more worth than her other non-
moral desires, such action would be in accordance with the moral law
only accidentally. The recognition of such a worth, required in order
for her action not to be merely accidentally in accordance with the
moral law would, however, imply transcendental freedom. Were the
recognition of the worth of such a principle to be grounded in pre-
existing susceptibilities of the agent, the principle could not be one
that is universally and categorically binding, since the ability to act in
accordance with it would thereby depend on the existing conditions
of the agent.
